

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 193715
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY P:GEMOOSE:S/P:MSPIEGEL:AVM
APPROVED BY P:GEMOOSE
S/S-O :LRFLEISCHER

-----047620 160529Z /10

O 160508Z AUG 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 193715

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR MOOSE FROM SPIEGEL AND MOOSE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: RH, TZ, UK, US, PGOV, PDEV, PINS

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF US, UK, AND TANZANIAN VIEWS ON
RHODESIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. AFTER REVIEWING THE RECORD OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH NYERERE HERE AND IN LONDON, OUR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE BRITISH ON THE RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, AND THE VARIOUS EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE BRITISH, NYERERE AND OURSELVES, WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE ARE BASIC DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG US ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. IN LARGE MEASURE THESE DIFFERENCES STEM FROM OUR HAVING REACHED UNDERSTANDINGS WITH NYERERE THAT GO BEYOND WHAT WE AND THE BRITISH HAD AGREED TO IN NEGOTIATING THE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE (E.G. ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORMING THE BASIS FOR THE ZIMBABWE ARMY). IN PART, THOUGH, IT IS ALSO DUE TO THE BRITISH SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE UN PEACEKEEPING
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 193715

FORCE AGREED TO BETWEEN CARTER AND OWEN. MOREOVER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE HAVE NOT MADE ENTIRELY CLEAR TO THE BRITISH WHAT WE AND NYERERE HAVE DISCUSSED. THIS IS UNDERSCORED BY NYERERE'S ADVERSE REACTION TO HIS TALK WITH OWEN, AND BY NYERERE'S DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED REACTIONS TO THE LETTERS HE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN.

2. THERE ARE THREE BASIC AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT OR MIS-UNDERSTANDING: (A) THE HANDLING OF PEACEKEEPING DURING

THE TRANSITION PERIOD; (B) THE DISPOSITION OF EXISTING FORCES (RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION) THROUGH THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND AT INDEPENDENCE; AND (3) THE PROCESS AND TIMING FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ADDRESSES WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE THE VARYING US, UK AND TANZANIAN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES.

3. PEACEKEEPING DURING THE TRANSITION: THE US, UK AND NYERERE AGREE THAT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING CIVIL ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION WILL REST WITH THE RHODESIAN POLICE. THE POLICE WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND WILL UNDERGO SOME PERSONNEL CHANGES (UNDEFINED) TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE, NEUTRAL FORCE. IT IS IN DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES THAT DIFFERENCES EMERGE:

(A) U.S. POSITION: THE UNITED STATES POSITION, AS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY STATED TO NYERERE AND THE BRITISH, HAS BEEN THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY DURING THE TRANSITION (BEYOND WHAT THE POLICE CAN DO). IT IS THE UN FORCES THAT WOULD BE CALLED IN FIRST TO PUT
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 193715

DOWN A DISTURBANCE. (REF. PRES.AGREEMENTS WITH NYERERE, PRES. LETTER TO NYERERE)

-- AS VANCE EXPLAINED IT TO NYERERE, IF THE POLICE WERE UNABLE TO HANDLE A PARTICULAR DISTURBANCE, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD CALL IN THE UN FORCES. IF NECESSARY, THE UN FORCES WOULD BE AUGMENTED BY LIBERATION FORCES AND/OR THE RHODESIAN ARMY. (REF. VANCE-NYERERE IN LONDON)

-- VANCE ALSO SAID THAT ONE FUNCTION OF THE UN FORCE WOULD BE TO HELP TRAIN THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY.

-- THOUGH VAGUE ON THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING, CARTER'S LETTER TO NYERERE MAY BE READ TO IMPLY THAT ONLY THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD GO UNDER THE DIRECT COMMAND OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER, THE LIBERATION FORCES AND THE UN FORCES BEING ONLY INDIRECTLY UNDER HIS COMMAND.

-- WHERE IN THE BEGINNING, WE REFERRED ONLY TO A UN FORCE, WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SUGGESTING A UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE.

(B) U.K. POSITION: IN THE UK COMMUNICATIONS WITH NYERERE, ITS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELYING ON A UN FORCE TO KEEP THE PEACE HAVE BEEN EVIDENT.

-- OWEN TOLD NYREETHAT THE UN FORCE WOULD "LINK THE OTHER TWO ARMIES," AND THAT IT WOULD PUT DOWN CIVIL DISTURBANCES THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT HANDLE BUT IF THERE WERE CONTINUED FIGHTING AFTER THE CEASEFIRE, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO CALL ON EITHER THE LIBERATION ARMY OR THE EXISTING DEFENSE FORCES. THIS IMPLIES THAT THE UN WOULD BE NOT THE MAJOR PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. IT WOULD BE USED TO HANDLE RELATIVELY
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 193715

MINOR DISTURBANCES TOO BIG FOR THE POLICE; BUT THE EXISTING ARMIES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE.

-- CALLAGHAN IN HIS LETTER TO NYERERE IMPLIED THAT ONE COULD NOT COUNT ON A STRONG MANDATE FOR THE UN FORCE, STATING THAT WE CANNOT TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL SUPPORT EVERYTHING WE PROPOSE. THE BRITISH ALSO HINTED THAT THEIR RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD BE PUT IN A DIFFICULT POSITION TRYING TO MAINTAIN PEACE ONLY WITH THE UN FORCES, SINCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE COMMAND OVER IT. (IT WAS MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD HAVE COMMAND OVER ALL THE EXISTING RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION FORCES.)

-- THE BRITISH TOLD NYERERE THAT THEY EXPECT THE NEW ARMY TO BE TRAINED UNDER THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER RATHER THAN THE UNITED NATIONS. (REF. OWEN TO NYERERE)

(C) NYERERE'S POSITION: FROM THE BEGINNING, NYERERE HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT SOME NEUTRAL ARMY -- A UN FORCE, A COMMONWEALTH ARMY, OR THE BRITISH ARMY -- WOULD "HAVE THE MAIN JOB OF LAW AND ORDER, ALONG WITH THE POLICE." HE TOLD OWEN THAT THE UN FORCE MUST BE "A REAL FORCE." (REF. NYERERE COMMENTS ON CALLAGHAN LETTER)

-- HE HAS ALSO CONSISTENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL THREE FORCES WOULD BE PRESENT DURING THE TRANSITION AND THAT THEY WOULD BE AT THE UK'S DISPOSAL. (REF. NYERERE/VANCE, NYERERE COMMENTS ON CARTER LETTER) HOWEVER, HE REACTED STRONGLY TO OWEN'S STATEMENT THAT THE UK MUST BE ABLE TO RELY ON THE EXISTING FORCES FOR DEALING WITH VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE SAID THAT THAT WAS NOT
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 193715

HIS UNDERSTANDING, THAT BRITAIN "CAN'T JUST SUPPLANT SMITH" (PRESUMABLY USING SMITH'S ARMY TO KEEP THE PEACE), THAT THEY "WILL FIND THEMSELVES FIGHTING THE GUERRILLAS."

-- HE HAS SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD COME UNDER FORMAL BRITISH COMMAND BUT FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WOULD MAINTAIN ITS OWN COMMAND STRUCTURE. HE STATED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FORCES WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE UN AND OTHERS BECAUSE "WE HAVE THE POWER TO ASSURE THIS."

-- IT APPEARS THAT THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN REACHED:

(1) THE US AND TANZANIA HAVE AGREED THAT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE PEACE WILL BE WITH THE UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE AND THE RHODESIAN POLICE. THERE IS AN IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OTHER ARMIES MAY BE CALLED ON, BUT WILL NOT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE.

(2) THE US AND UK HAVE AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE A UN RATHER THAN A COMMONWEALTH FORCE, WITH SOME POSSIBILITY OF A UN FORCE MADE UP OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

(3) THE ROLE OF THE UN FORCE IN PEACEKEEPING, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXISTING FORCES IN PEACEKEEPING, THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING THE NEW ARMY ARE ALL ISSUES ON WHICH DIFFERENCES REMAIN.

4. DISPOSITION OF EXISTING ARMED FORCES.

(A) US POSITION. DURING NYERERE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT CARTER AGREED THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY, TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGED FROM THE ELECTIONS, WOULD BE BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. THE PRESIDENT FURTHER
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 193715

ACKNOWLEDGED NYERERE'S POINT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD NOT "INHERIT" THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES. BY IMPLICATION, THESE FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED BY THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AFTER THE MEETINGS WITH NYERERE THAT US AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS WENT FARTHER THAN THE BRITISH WERE PREPARED TO GO.

-- DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S MEETING WITH NYERERE IN LONDON, NYERERE THOUGHT HIS ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN CONFIRMED. (ACTUALLY, AS WE READ THE NOTES OF THAT DISCUSSION, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE LACK OF CLARITY ON WHAT WAS OR WAS NOT AGREED. BOTH MEN DID AGREE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW FORCES.) IN ANY EVENT, CARTER'S AUGUST 14 LETTER TO NYERERE REAFFIRMED THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER AND "ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DISPOSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY HIM, IN CON-

SULTATION WITH THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE LIBERATION FORCES' COMMANDERS." (IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NYERERE READ THIS AS A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE LIBERATION FORCES.

(B) NYERERE'S POSITION: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NEVER CLARIFIED WHAT WE MEANT BY AN INDEPENDENCE ARMY "BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES," NYERERE SEEMS TO HAVE A PRECISE IDEA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER, AND LATER REITERATED TO SECRETARY VANCE IN LONDON, THAT THE NEW ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WOULD BE THE ARMY BEING TRAINED BY THE GUERRILLAS, PRIMARILY IN TANZANIA. THIS ARMY WOULD TAKE OVER AT INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE THAT WOULD MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 193715

DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE NEW GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, MAY FEEL THERE ARE SOME ELEMENTS IN THE SMITH ARMY WHICH WOULD QUALIFY TO BE IN THE NEW ARMY.

-- IN HIS AUGUST 15 DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR SPAIN, NYERERE REITERATED THE VIEW HE HAD EXPRESSED EARLIER TO OWEN AND SECRETARY VANCE THAT "THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OF ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM. A ALL THREE FORCES, LIBERATION, UN OR COMMONWEALTH AND RHODESIAN -- WOULD BE THERE ON TRANSITION DAY ONE. BUT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE THE ELIMINATION OF "NEGATIVE ELEMENTS" OF SMITH'S ARMY (AND NOT JUST THE SELOUS SCOUTS). NYERERE SAID HE NEEDED CONFIDENCE THAT SMITH'S FORCES WOULD NOT LAST THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHILE NYERERE ENVISAGES THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMY WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY DISMANTLED DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WILL REMAIN LARGELY INTACT AND ONLY NOMINALLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER. THUS, AS HE EXPLAINED TO OWEN IN LONDON, THERE WOULD BE ONLY TWO ARMIES REMAINING BY INDEPENDENCE DAY -- THE INCOMING ARMY, I.E. THE LIBERATION FORCES, AND THE OUTGOING ARMY, I.E. THE UN. NYERERE UNDERScoreD THIS BY DRAWING A PARALLEL TO THE SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE WHERE THE OUTGOING PORTUGUESE FORCES TURNED OVER MILITARY CONTROL TO THE INCOMING FRELIMO FORCES. NYERERE BELIEVES WE ARE IN FULL ACCORD WITH HIM ON THIS VIEW. THIS BELIEF WAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHENED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER, PARTICULARLY THE IMPLICATION THAT WHEREAS THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE "DIRECTLY" UNDER THE CONTROL

OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD

HAVE A DIFFERENT STATUS.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 193715

(C) U.K. UNDERSTANDING: IN ESSENCE, THE UK UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THERE WILL BE AT LEAST A PARTIAL DEMOBILIZATION OF BOTH THE EXISTING RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION ARMIES AND THE CREATION OF A "NEW" ARMY. THE BRITISH (E.G. IN OWEN'S TALK WITH NYERERE) HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE LIBERATION ARMY WOULD FORM THE "MAJOR ELEMENT" OF THE NEW ARMY. NEVERTHELESS, IMPLICITLY THEY SEE THE LIBERATION ARMY AS UNDERGOING A SIGNIFICANT TRANSFORMATION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, SUCH THAT BY INDEPENDENCE IT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS THE PRESENT PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMY. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING THIS NEW ARMY WOULD REST WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER.

-- WHEN OWEN OUTLINED THE ABOVE IDEAS TO NYERERE IN LONDON, THE LATTER REACTED THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS UNDERSTANDING AND REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD REMAIN ESSENTIALLY INTACT AND UNDER ITS OWN COMMAND THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WHILE CONCEDING THAT THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD NOMINALLY BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, NYERERE DID NOT ENVISAGE THIS AMOUNTING TO MUCH IN PRACTICE. MOREOVER, NYERERE MAY BE CORRECT IN INFERRING FROM CALLAGHAN'S LETTER THAT THE BRITISH STILL SEE ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY AS THE BASE FOR THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY. EVEN THOUGH THE BRITISH MAY BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT THE BULK OF THE NEW ARMY WILL BE FORMED FROM THE LIBERATION FORCES, THEY PROBABLY STILL BELIEVE THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR PROFESSIONALISM, WILL ACTUALLY BECOME THE NUCLEUS AND HENCE THE DOMINANT ELEMENT IN THE NEW ARMY. THIS, IN OWEN'S VIEW, IS NEEDED TO CREATE CONFIDENCE AMONG THE WHITES.

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 193715

4. THE PROCESS AND TIMING OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

(A) TIMING: IN CONSULTING ON THE RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT PACKAGE, WE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE VAGUE LANGUAGE WHICH THE BRITISH PROPOSED FOR PARAGRAPH 11.C., WHICH LEFT ESSENTIALLY UNDEFINED THE NATURE OF THE UN ROLE DURING THE TRANSITION. THE BRITISH, INTERPRETING THAT LANGUAGE MORE LITERALLY THAN WE, HAVE TOLD NYERERE THAT THE KEY QUESTIONS OF THE UN ROLE AND THE DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES CANNOT BE DECIDED UNTIL AFTER THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN APPOINTED. OBVIOUSLY IN OUR DISCUSSION WITH NYERERE AND OTHERS, WE HAVE NOT RE-

FRAINED FROM MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT NYERERE WANTS SOME AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE HE WILL ENDORSE THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. HE HAS TOLD US THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE NOT COMPLETE UNLESS THEY INCLUDE A PLAN FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND THAT HE WILL NOT CONVENE A MEETING OF THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS UNTIL SUCH A PLAN IS READY. CALLAGHAN'S LETTER HAS FURTHER AROUSED NYERERE'S SUSPICIONS CONCERNING OUR PLANS AND HAS PROMPTED HIM TO ASK FOR MORE SPECIFICS ON THE PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR DISMANTLING SMITH'S FORCES.

-- IN HIS LETTER TO NYERERE, PRESIDENT CARTER STATED THAT WE NEED MORE PRECISION ON IMPORTANT POINTS, SUGGESTING THAT THIS COULD COME OUT OF AN OWEN-YOUNG MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE. WE HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, TAKEN OWEN'S VIEW THAT DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST AWAIT THE APPOINTMENT OF A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. GIVEN NYERERE'S SUSPICIONS, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TRANSMITTED TO AND SHARED BY THE OTHER FRONT LINE LEADERS, IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT WE CAN GET AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC OUTLINES OF OUR PROPOSAL
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 193715

AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

(B) PROCESS: FINALLY, ON THE MODALITIES FOR NEGOTIATING THE DETAILED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE BRITISH HAVE TOLD NYERERE THAT THESE WOULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH THE RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION ARMIES. THIS IS CONTRARY TO OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH NYERERE THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE UK COMMISSIONER, UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE COMMANDER (S) OF THE LIBERATION FORCES. IN NYERERE'S VIEW, THE DISPOSITION OF THE LIBERATION FORCES IS NOT AT ISSUE SINCE THEY WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY INTACT.

VANCE

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 193715
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY: UNA:AFHOLLOWAY

S-S/O:TMARTIN

-----072310 172144Z /61

O 172016Z AUG 77 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 193715

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 193715 SENT ACTION LONDON 16 AUG 77

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 193715

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR MOOSE FROM SPIEGEL AND MOOSE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: RH, TZ, UK, US, PGOV, PDEV, PINS

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF US, UK, AND TANZANIAN VIEWS ON
RHODESIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. AFTER REVIEWING THE RECORD OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH
NYERERE HERE AND IN LONDON, OUR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE
BRITISH ON THE RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS, AND THE
VARIOUS EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE BRITISH,
NYERERE AND OURSELVES, WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 193715

THERE ARE BASIC DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG US ON THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. IN LARGE
MEASURE THESE DIFFERENCES STEM FROM OUR HAVING REACHED
UNDERSTANDINGS WITH NYERERE THAT GO BEYOND WHAT WE AND
THE BRITISH HAD AGREED TO IN NEGOTIATING THE SETTLEMENT
PACKAGE (E.G. ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORMING THE BASIS FOR
THE ZIMBABWE ARMY). IN PART, THOUGH, IT IS ALSO DUE TO
THE BRITISH SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE UN PEACEKEEPING
FORCE AGREED TO BETWEEN CARTER AND OWEN. MOREOVER, IT
WOULD APPEAR THAT WE HAVE NOT MADE ENTIRELY CLEAR TO THE
BRITISH WHAT WE AND NYERERE HAVE DISCUSSED. THIS IS UNDER-
SCORED BY NYERERE'S ADVERSE REACTION TO HIS TALK WITH
OWEN, AND BY NYERERE'S DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED REACTIONS
TO THE LETTERS HE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AND
PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN.

2. THERE ARE THREE BASIC AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT OR MIS-

UNDERSTANDING: (A) THE HANDLING OF PEACEKEEPING DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD; (B) THE DISPOSITION OF EXISTING FORCES (RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION) THROUGH THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND AT INDEPENDENCE; AND (3) THE PROCESS AND TIMING FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ADDRESSES WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE THE VARYING US, UK AND TANZANIAN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES.

3. PEACEKEEPING DURING THE TRANSITION: THE US, UK AND NYERERE AGREE THAT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING CIVIL ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION WILL REST WITH THE RHODESIAN POLICE. THE POLICE WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND WILL UNDERGO SOME PERSONNEL CHANGES (UNDEFINED) TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE, NEUTRAL FORCE. IT IS IN DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 193715

VARIOUS ARMIES THAT DIFFERENCES EMERGE:

(A) U.S. POSITION: THE UNITED STATES POSITION, AS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY STATED TO NYERERE AND THE BRITISH, HAS BEEN THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY DURING THE TRANSITION (BEYOND WHAT THE POLICE CAN DO). IT IS THE UN FORCES THAT WOULD BE CALLED IN FIRST TO PUT DOWN A DISTURBANCE. (REF. PRES.AGREEMENTS WITH NYERERE, PRES. LETTER TO NYERERE)

-- AS VANCE EXPLAINED IT TO NYERERE, IF THE POLICE WERE UNABLE TO HANDLE A PARTICULAR DISTURBANCE, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD CALL IN THE UN FORCES. IF NECESSARY, THE UN FORCES WOULD BE AUGMENTED BY LIBERATION FORCES AND/OR THE RHODESIAN ARMY. (REF. VANCE-NYERERE IN LONDON)

-- VANCE ALSO SAID THAT ONE FUNCTION OF THE UN FORCE WOULD BE TO HELP TRAIN THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY.

-- THOUGH VAGUE ON THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING, CARTER'S LETTER TO NYERERE MAY BE READ TO IMPLY THAT ONLY THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD GO UNDER THE DIRECT COMMAND OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER, THE LIBERATION FORCES AND THE UN FORCES BEING ONLY INDIRECTLY UNDER HIS COMMAND.

-- WHERE IN THE BEGINNING, WE REFERRED ONLY TO A UN FORCE, WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SUGGESTING A UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE.

(B) U.K. POSITION: IN THE UK COMMUNICATIONS WITH NYERERE, ITS RESERVATIONS ABOUT RELYING ON A UN FORCE TO KEEP THE

PEACE HAVE BEEN EVIDENT.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 193715

-- OWEN TOLD NYERERE THAT THE UN FORCE WOULD "LINK THE OTHER TWO ARMIES," AND THAT IT WOULD PUT DOWN CIVIL DISTURBANCES THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT HANDLE BUT IF THERE WERE CONTINUED FIGHTING AFTER THE CEASEFIRE, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO CALL ON EITHER THE LIBERATION ARMY OR THE EXISTING DEFENSE FORCES. THIS IMPLIES THAT THE UN WOULD BE NOT THE MAJOR PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. IT WOULD BE USED TO HANDLE RELATIVELY MINOR DISTURBANCES TOO BIG FOR THE POLICE; BUT THE EXISTING ARMIES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE.

-- CALLAGHAN IN HIS LETTER TO NYERERE IMPLIED THAT ONE COULD NOT COUNT ON A STRONG MANDATE FOR THE UN FORCE, STATING THAT WE CANNOT TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL SUPPORT EVERYTHING WE PROPOSE. THE BRITISH ALSO HINTED THAT THEIR RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD BE PUT IN A DIFFICULT POSITION TRYING TO MAINTAIN PEACE ONLY WITH THE UN FORCES, SINCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE COMMAND OVER IT. (IT WAS MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD HAVE COMMAND OVER ALL THE EXISTING RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION FORCES.)

-- THE BRITISH TOLD NYERERE THAT THEY EXPECT THE NEW ARMY TO BE TRAINED UNDER THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER RATHER THAN THE UNITED NATIONS. (REF. OWEN TO NYERERE)

(C) NYERERE'S POSITION: FROM THE BEGINNING, NYERERE HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT SOME NEUTRAL ARMY -- A UN FORCE, A COMMONWEALTH ARMY, OR THE BRITISH ARMY -- WOULD "HAVE THE MAIN JOB OF LAW AND ORDER, ALONG WITH THE POLICE." HE TOLD OWEN THAT THE UN FORCE MUST BE "A REAL FORCE." (REF. NYERERE COMMENTS ON CALLAGHAN LETTER)

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 193715

-- HE HAS ALSO CONSISTENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL THREE FORCES WOULD BE PRESENT DURING THE TRANSITION AND THAT THEY WOULD BE AT THE UK'S DISPOSAL. (REF. NYERERE/VANCE, NYERERE COMMENTS ON CARTER LETTER) HOWEVER, HE REACTED STRONGLY TO OWEN'S STATEMENT THAT THE UK MUST BE ABLE TO RELY ON THE EXISTING FORCES FOR DEALING WITH VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE SAID THAT THAT WAS NOT HIS UNDERSTANDING, THAT BRITAIN "CAN'T JUST SUPPLANT SMITH" (PRESUMABLY USING SMITH'S ARMY TO KEEP THE PEACE), THAT THEY "WILL FIND THEMSELVES FIGHTING THE GUERRILLAS."

-- HE HAS SAID THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD COME UNDER FORMAL BRITISH COMMAND BUT FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WOULD MAINTAIN ITS OWN COMMAND STRUCTURE. HE STATED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FORCES WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE UN AND OTHERS BECAUSE "WE HAVE THE POWER TO ASSURE THIS."

-- IT APPEARS THAT THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN REACHED:

(1) THE US AND TANZANIA HAVE AGREED THAT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE PEACE WILL BE WITH THE UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE AND THE RHODESIAN POLICE. THERE IS AN IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OTHER ARMIES MAY BE CALLED ON, BUT WILL NOT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE.

(2) THE US AND UK HAVE AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE A UN RATHER THAN A COMMONWEALTH FORCE, WITH SOME POSSIBILITY OF A UN FORCE MADE UP OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

(3) THE ROLE OF THE UN FORCE IN PEACEKEEPING, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXISTING FORCES IN PEACEKEEPING, THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING THE NEW ARMY ARE ALL ISSUES ON WHICH DIFFERENCES REMAIN.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 193715

4. DISPOSITION OF EXISTING ARMED FORCES.

(A) US POSITION. DURING NYERERE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT CARTER AGREED THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY, TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGED FROM THE ELECTIONS, WOULD BE BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. THE PRESIDENT FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGED NYERERE'S POINT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD NOT "INHERIT" THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES. BY IMPLICATION, THESE FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED BY THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AFTER THE MEETINGS WITH NYERERE THAT US AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS WENT FARTHER THAN THE BRITISH WERE PREPARED TO GO.

-- DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S MEETING WITH NYERERE IN LONDON, NYERERE THOUGHT HIS ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN CONFIRMED. (ACTUALLY, AS WE READ THE NOTES OF THAT DISCUSSION, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE LACK OF CLARITY ON WHAT WAS OR WAS NOT AGREED. BOTH MEN DID AGREE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW FORCES.) IN ANY EVENT, CARTER'S AUGUST 14 LETTER TO NYERERE REAFFIRMED THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER AND "ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR DISPOSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY HIM, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE

LIBERATION FORCES' COMMANDERS." (IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NYERERE READ THIS AS A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE LIBERATION FORCES.

(B) NYERERE'S POSITION: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NEVER
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 193715

CLARIFIED WHAT WE MEANT BY AN INDEPENDENCE ARMY "BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES," NYERERE SEEMS TO HAVE A PRECISE IDEA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER, AND LATER REITERATED TO SECRETARY VANCE IN LONDON, THAT THE NEW ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WOULD BE THE ARMY BEING TRAINED BY THE GUERRILLAS, PRIMARILY IN TANZANIA. THIS ARMY WOULD TAKE OVER AT INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE THAT WOULD MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE NEW GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, MAY FEEL THERE ARE SOME ELEMENTS IN THE SMITH ARMY WHICH WOULD QUALIFY TO BE IN THE NEW ARMY.

-- IN HIS AUGUST 15 DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR SPAIN, NYERERE REITERATED THE VIEW HE HAD EXPRESSED EARLIER TO OWEN AND SECRETARY VANCE THAT "THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OF ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM. A ALL THREE FORCES, LIBERATION, UN OR COMMONWEALTH AND RHODESIAN -- WOULD BE THERE ON TRANSITION DAY ONE. BUT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE THE ELIMINATION OF "NEGATIVE ELEMENTS" OF SMITH'S ARMY (AND NOT JUST THE SELOUS SCOUTS). NYERERE SAID HE NEEDED CONFIDENCE THAT SMITH'S FORCES WOULD NOT LAST THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHILE NYERERE ENVISAGES THAT THE RHODESIAN ARMY WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY DISMANTLED DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WILL REMAIN LARGELY INTACT AND ONLY NOMINALLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER. THUS, AS HE EXPLAINED TO OWEN IN LONDON, THERE WOULD BE ONLY TWO ARMIES REMAINING BY INDEPENDENCE DAY -- THE INCOMING ARMY, I.E. THE LIBERATION FORCES, AND THE OUTGOING ARMY, I.E. THE UN. NYERERE UNDERSCORED THIS BY DRAWING A PARALLEL TO THE SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE WHERE THE OUTGOING PORTUGUESE FORCES TURNED OVER MILITARY CONTROL TO
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 193715

THE INCOMING FRELIMO FORCES. NYERERE BELIEVES WE ARE IN FULL ACCORD WITH HIM ON THIS VIEW. THIS BELIEF WAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHENED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER, PARTICULARLY THE IMPLICATION THAT WHEREAS THE EXISTING

RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE "DIRECTLY" UNDER THE CONTROL
OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD
HAVE A DIFFERENT STATUS.

(C) U.K. UNDERSTANDING: IN ESSENCE, THE UK UNDER-
STANDING IS THAT THERE WILL BE AT LEAST A PARTIAL DE-
MOBILIZATION OF BOTH THE EXISTING RHODESIAN AND LIBERA-
TION ARMIES AND THE CREATION OF A "NEW" ARMY. THE
BRITISH (E.G. IN OWEN'S TALK WITH NYERERE) HAVE ACCEPTED
THAT THE LIBERATION ARMY WOULD FORM THE "MAJOR ELEMENT"
OF THE NEW ARMY. NEVERTHELESS, IMPLICITLY THEY SEE THE
LIBERATION ARMY AS UNDERGOING A SIGNIFICANT TRANSFORMA-
TION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, SUCH THAT BY INDE-
PENDENCE IT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS THE PRESENT
PATRIOTIC FRONT ARMY. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING THIS
NEW ARMY WOULD REST WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER.

-- WHEN OWEN OUTLINED THE ABOVE IDEAS TO NYERERE IN
LONDON, THE LATTER REACTED THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS UNDER-
STANDING AND REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT THE LIBERATION
FORCES WOULD REMAIN ESSENTIALLY INTACT AND UNDER ITS OWN
COMMAND THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD. WHILE CON-
CEDING THAT THE LIBERATION FORCES WOULD NOMINALLY BE
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, NYERERE
DID NOT ENVISAGE THIS AMOUNTING TO MUCH IN PRACTICE.
MOREOVER, NYERERE MAY BE CORRECT IN INFERRING FROM
CALLAGHAN'S LETTER THAT THE BRITISH STILL SEE ELEMENTS
OF SMITH'S ARMY AS THE BASE FOR THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY.
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 193715

EVEN THOUGH THE BRITISH MAY BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT
THE BULK OF THE NEW ARMY WILL BE FORMED FROM THE
LIBERATION FORCES, THEY PROBABLY STILL BELIEVE THAT THE
EXISTING RHODESIAN FORCES, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR PROFESSION-
ALISM, WILL ACTUALLY BECOME THE NUCLEUS AND HENCE THE
DOMINANT ELEMENT IN THE NEW ARMY. THIS, IN OWEN'S VIEW,
IS NEEDED TO CREATE CONFIDENCE AMONG THE WHITES.

4. THE PROCESS AND TIMING OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

(A) TIMING: IN CONSULTING ON THE RHODESIAN SETTLE-
MENT PACKAGE, WE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE VAGUE LANGUAGE
WHICH THE BRITISH PROPOSED FOR PARAGRAPH 11.C., WHICH
LEFT ESSENTIALLY UNDEFINED THE NATURE OF THE UN ROLE
DURING THE TRANSITION. THE BRITISH, INTERPRETING THAT
LANGUAGE MORE LITERALLY THAN WE, HAVE TOLD NYERERE THAT
THE KEY QUESTIONS OF THE UN ROLE AND THE DISPOSITION OF
THE ARMIES CANNOT BE DECIDED UNTIL AFTER THE UN SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN APPOINTED. OBVIOUSLY IN OUR
DISCUSSION WITH NYERERE AND OTHERS, WE HAVE NOT RE-

FRAINED FROM MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT NYERERE WANTS SOME AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE HE WILL ENDORSE THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. HE HAS TOLD US THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE NOT COMPLETE UNLESS THEY INCLUDE A PLAN FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND THAT HE WILL NOT CONVENE A MEETING OF THE OTHER FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS UNTIL SUCH A PLAN IS READY. CALLAGHAN'S LETTER HAS FURTHER AROUSED NYERERE'S SUSPICIONS CONCERNING OUR PLANS AND HAS PROMPTED HIM TO ASK FOR MORE SPECIFICS ON THE PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR DISMANTLING SMITH'S FORCES.

-- IN HIS LETTER TO NYERERE, PRESIDENT CARTER STATED THAT WE NEED MORE PRECISION ON IMPORTANT POINTS, SUG-
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 193715

GESTING THAT THIS COULD COME OUT OF AN OWEN-YOUNG MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE. WE HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, TAKEN OWEN'S VIEW THAT DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MUST AWAIT THE APPOINTMENT OF A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. GIVEN NYERERE'S SUSPICIONS, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TRANSMITTED TO AND SHARED BY THE OTHER FRONT LINE LEADERS, IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT WE CAN GET AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC OUTLINES OF OUR PROPOSAL AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

(B) PROCESS: FINALLY, ON THE MODALITIES FOR NEGOTIATING THE DETAILED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE BRITISH HAVE TOLD NYERERE THAT THESE WOULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER, THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH THE RHODESIAN AND LIBERATION ARMIES. THIS IS CONTRARY TO OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH NYERERE THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE UK COMMISSIONER, UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE COMMANDER (S) OF THE LIBERATION FORCES. IN NYERERE'S VIEW, THE DISPOSITION OF THE LIBERATION FORCES IS NOT AT ISSUE SINCE THEY WILL REMAIN ESSENTIALLY INTACT.

VANCE

UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, SECURITY, ARMED FORCES,
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 16-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE193715
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: P:GEMOOSE/S:P:MSPIEGEL:AVM
Enclosure: EYES ONLY FOR MOOSE
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P840081-2537
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197708117/baaaetnm.tel
Line Count: 753
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e3e75751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 14
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1445819
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANALYSIS OF US, UK, AND TANZANIAN VIEWS ON RHODESIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
TAGS: PGOV, PDEV, PINS, RH, TZ, UK, US, UN
To: LONDON
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e3e75751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009